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For the nearly two years that Americans were held hostage in Tehe-
ran, United States courts presided over complex litigation brought to
wrest assets from the revolutionary government of Iran. The litigants
were varied and powerful: United States banks and corporations, Ira-
nian banks and commercial ventures, and the governments of both the
United States and Iran. On any given issue, unexpected coalitions of
interests formed among the litigants. While the United States and Iran
hurled insults at each other for months, lawyers for those governments
were nearly always in accord on major issues raised in United States
courts. And, while United States banks-were prominent plaintiffs, they
were, in fact, not wholly hostile to the Iranian defendants. Moreover,
despite the litigation's simple focus-money--difficult issues demanded
litigants' attention, issues that eventually required extraordinary review
by the Supreme Court. This Article examines chronologically the role
of the Iranian assets litigation in the broader resolution of the Iranian
crisis. It considers in particular novel issues of procedure, unique sub-
stantive rulings, and the remarkably congruent interests of the United
States government, the Iranian government, and the banking plaintiffs.
I. The Commercial Background
For thirty years after World War II, United States corporate interests
flourished in Iran, as that -nation used its burgeoning oil reserves to
build an infrastructure of highways, telecommunications, and industry.
The governments of Iran and the United States encouraged and pro-
tected the development of commercial relationships under formal ac-
cords, including the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights.' In 1978, the close ties between the two governments
began to unravel. Angry demonstrations against the Shah and against
the United States erupted in Iran, including the torching and attempted
t Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
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I. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United
States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Amity].
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seizure of the United States Embassy.2 In January, 1979, the Shah
finally fled Iran, prompting the United States to evacuate American
dependents and non-essential personnel. 3 On February 1, 1979, the
Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Teheran from exile in France and as-
sumed power. His vow to end American commercial domination of
Iran became one of the revolution's most powerful unifying themes.
4
As economic and political relations between Iran and the United
States worsened, some prescient United States creditors, early victims
of Iran's renunciation of commercial responsibilities, brought suit
against Iranian defendants.5 The creditors' foresight served them well:
the eventual deal between the United States and Iran recognized the
validity of attachments and judgments acquired prior to the hostage-
taking.
6
On November 4, 1979, a mob seized the United States Embassy in
Teheran, taking Americans hostage.7 Simultaneously, Iran threatened
to withdraw all of its funds from accounts in United States banks and
their overseas branches and to transfer those funds to other countries.8
II. The Freeze
On November 14, 1979, President Carter responded to Iran's threat
by freezing all assets located in the United States, or in the possession
of persons subject to the United States' jurisdiction, in which the gov-
ernment of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities, and the
Central Bank of Iran had an interest.9 The freeze included deposits in
2. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1978, at 82 (supplementary material from N.Y. Times News
Service and the Assoc. Press); id, Nov. 5, 1978, at 29; id., Nov. 6, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 6; id,
Dec. 9, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
3. Id, Jan. 17, 1979, § I, at 1, col. 4; id, Jan. 31, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
4. Id, Feb. 1, 1979, § I, at 1, col. 6; id, Mar. 1, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 3.
5. Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979) (com-
plaint filed Feb. 28, 1979 seeking sums due for freight forwarding services and attachment of
defendant's assets in plaintiffs possession); Elec. Data Systems Corp. Iran v. Social Security
Organization of the Gov't of Iran, No. CA 3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 1980) (awarding
$19 million to plaintiff EDS in suit for contract breach), appeal dismissed, 616 F.2d 566 (5th
Cir. 1980), preliminary injunction issued, 508 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (prohibiting
action by U.S. officials to interfere with enforcement ofjudgment), a 'dinpart, rev'd in part,
Nos. 79-2641 etal (5th Cir. July 15, 1981). See also Am. Bell Int'l, Inc., v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (suit seeking order prohibiting bank from making
payment under letter of credit running to benefit of Iran).
6. See note 115 infra.
7. N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1979, § I, at 1, col. 6.
8. Id, Nov. 15, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 5. After the President had relied on that announce-
ment as justification for freezing Iranian assets, however, the Iranian government advertised
in U.S. newspapers that it did not intend to withdraw its assets and that it would honor all
"legitimate" debts. E.g., Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1979, at 10, col. 1.
9. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979).
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United States banks and their foreign branches. The President found
authority for his action in the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act (IEEPA).' ° This act had been interpreted to empower the Pres-
ident to freeze, but not to seize, assets;" President Carter, therefore,
could not vest title to the assets in the United States. Indeed, in an-
nouncing the freeze order, the White House seemed to recognize this
limitation, noting that "[t]he purpose of this order is to insure that
claims on Iran by the United States and its citizens are provided for in
an orderly manner."' 2 Despite that assertion, the United States pro-
ceeded in a fashion which virtually guaranteed that claims would not
be handled in an orderly way.
To implement the President's freeze order, the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control issued the Iranian Assets Control Regula-
tions.' 3 Initially, the regulations prohibited any transfer or acquisition
of interest in Iranian assets, including any attachment or other judicial
process.' 4 On November 23, 1979, however, the Treasury issued a gen-
eral license authorizing private litigants to institute attachment pro-
ceedings against Iranian assets, but neither to obtain, nor to execute a
judgment.'
5
One of the initial Iranian assets regulations also prohibited banks
from using any frozen assets as payment on the enormous loans out-
standing to Iran.' 6 Before the ink was dry, the Treasury amended that
regulation to allow overseas branches or subsidiaries of domestic banks
to set off their claims against Iran by debiting blocked accounts held by
10. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (Supp. III 1979).
11. Hermann, Iran: The Legal Battles for Loan Protection, Financial Times of London,
Jan. 10, 1980, at 20, col. 3. The IEEPA was enacted in order to limit the President's broad
powers during periods of national emergency, powers originally granted by the 1917 Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. app. § I et seq. (1976 and Supp. III 1979). The
TWEA had allowed the President to vest title to foreign assets in the United States, i.e. to
take title to foreign property. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 5(b), 7(c) (1976 and Supp. III 1979). In the
parallel section of the IEEPA, Congress deliberately deleted any reference to "vesting" title.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (Supp. III 1979); S. REP. No. 95-466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4540,4543 ("Authority to vest property. . . would
not be granted" as part of the President's emergency authority "to control or freeze property
transactions where a foreign interest is involved.")
12. 15 WEEKLY COMP. oF PRES. Doc. 2117 (Nov. 14, 1979).
13. 31 C.F.R. § 535 (1980).
14. 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1980).
15. 31 C.F.R. § 535.504 (1980). The regulations had previously included the warning
that any license was revocable by the Treasury Department. 31 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1980).
One reason for Treasury's licensing attachments was to permit creditors to establish priori-
ties on the assets. In November, 1979, it was still hoped that the hostage crisis would be
short-lived and that the assets would not be needed by the United States for bargaining.
Tolerating this first step of litigation minimized the Executive Branch's intrusion-then
hoped to be temporary-on the judicial process and on private dispute resolution.
16. 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1980).
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them for Iran.17 This power permitted the banks to engage in un-
checked self-help by setting off frozen Iranian deposits in foreign
branches against the banks' foreign and domestic claims against Iran.
While banks could not assert set-off rights against Iran's bank and
deposits in the United States, they could nonetheless seek to attach
those deposits for cause. The banks created the required justification
by declaring Iran's loans to be in default. As a result of the freeze, Iran
was unable to pay interest on various loans, including one for $500
million extended by an eleven-bank syndicate. On Iran's failure to pay
interest, Chase Manhattan, the syndicate agent, declared the entire loan
to be in default. A domino effect followed, with loan after loan colaps-
ing, partially as a result of cross-default clauses.18 With defaults de-
clared by the major banking creditors of Iran, the public race to attach
assets was on in earnest. 19 The major banks, having the advantage of
knowing the exact location of Iran's wealth,20 and forewarned that a
freeze of assets was likely,21 won the race handily, and many banks
filed suit before the end of November.
22
17. 31 C.F.R. § 535.902 (1980). Even without the amendment, "[w]ithin hours of the
freeze" the banks had begun to set off Iran's debts against its deposits. Iranian Asset Settle-
ment.' Hearings before the US. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Hearings] (statement of Hans H.
Angermueller). The speed with which the banks claimed set-offs may be attributable to
prior knowledge of the freeze's imminence. The Chairman of the House Banking Commit-
tee later concluded that pre-freeze activities by government officials "provided an opportu-
nity for experienced bank officials to deduce that an assets freeze was to take place in the not
too distant future." STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
97TH CONG., IST SESS., IRAN: THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT V (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE PRINT].
18. See Murphy, E O. 12170: The Persian Gulp, AM. BANKER, Dec. 20, 1979, at 1, 7, 11.
19. See Ball, The Unseemly Squabble Over Iran's Assets, FORTUNE, Jan. 28, 1980, at 60.
20. Initially, the Department of the Treasury valued the blocked assets at about $8 bil-
lion: $1.8 billion held by the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, including $1.2 billion in
Treasury securities and $.6 billion in gold; $400 million on deposit with the United States
Treasury for military equipment; $1 billion on deposit with domestic United States banks;
more than $500 million on deposit in domestic non-bank U.S. companies, and $4 billion on
deposit in foreign branches or subsidiaries of U.S. banks. Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1979, at D7,
col. 1. The banks, of course, had trade knowledge of many of the deposits.
21. See note 17 supra.
22. Eg., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. The State of Iran, No. 79-6312 (S.D.N.Y., filed
Nov. 26, 1979), consolidated sub nom. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power
Generation and Transmission Co., note 33 infra (demanding $66 million due on two loans
and three overdrafts). In addition, the banks engaged in major litigation in French, English,
and German courts, principally over the extraterritorial effect of the President's freeze. See
Hoffman, The Iranian Assets Litigation, in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1980 329, 343-46, 356-60 (M. Landwehr ed.
1980). It was Citibank's involvement in German litigation that initiated discussions between
the banks and Iran to settle all of the assets litigation. See text accompanying notes 42-45
infra.
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III. The Race to Attach
Non-bank plaintiffs' suits then proliferated in numbers that the Exec-
utive Branch may not have envisioned. Within the first two weeks of
the President's freeze, thirty suits were fied in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York alone.23 New York
was the locus of nearly all Iran's liquid assets, including gold and se-
curities at the New York Federal Reserve Bank,24 and for that reason,
the Southern District became the arena for most of the subsequent liti-
gation. Nationwide, the assets were more diverse and included military
aircraft,25 hypothetical blocked accounts, 26 road-building equipment,
and modular housing units destined for Iran.27
This rush of plaintiffs, storming through the attachment gap in the
assets regulations, threatened to undermine the United States strategy
for dealing with the hostage crisis. Government officials possibly
feared that the regulations' prohibition of final judgments would not
withstand either the political pressure built up by litigated victories
against Iran or judicial scrutiny of the propriety of the ban. If the pro-
hibition were overturned, and the assets distributed, the United States
would lose its primary bargaining chip for the safe return of the
hostages.
Accordingly, the United States sought to dampen the litigation fires,
particularly in New York. On January 10, 1980, the Legal Adviser of
the Department of State, Roberts B. Owen, wrote Attorney General
Benjamin Civiletti "strongly support[ing] a temporary stay of [court]
proceedings in the interests of the foreign relations of the United
States."'28 The Legal Adviser asserted that the United States was in the
23. Legal Times of Wash., Dec. 10, 1979, at 1, col. 2.
24. Under § 4 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), the property of a for-
eign central bank held forits own account is immune from attachment, unless this immunity
is explicitly waived. 28 U.S.C. § 161 l(b) (1976). Iranian defendants consistently repre-
sented that the gold at the Federal Reserve Bank belonged to the Bank Markazi, the central
bank of Iran.
25. Section 4 of the FSIA provides absolute immunity from attachment of military prop-
erty, 28 U.S.C. § 161 l(b)(2)(A) (1976). Notwithstanding this provision, at least one plaintiff
sought to attach airplanes ordered by the Iranian Air Force. E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 491 F. Supp. 1294, 1299-1300 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
26. 491 F. Supp. at 1297-99. The plaintiff had a potential liability to an American bank,
which had issued letters of credit running to the benefit of an Iranian bank. Under the
Iranian assets regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.568 (1980), the plaintiff sought to create, and then
attach, a hypothetical "blocked account" on its own books representing an obligation to the
Iranian bank, a device that the court rejected.
27. See U.S. Filter Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. C79-574T (W.D. Wash., filed
Dec. 27, 1979).
28. Attachment to Suggestion of Interest of the United States, McCollough & Co. Inc. v.
The Gov't of Iran, No. 80-406 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 22, 1980) consolidated sub nor. New
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midst of "an unprecedented international crisis," that it was making
"the most diligent efforts . . to bring about the release of the hos-
tages," and that "[d]evelopments in the Iranian assets cases now pend-
ing could complicate these continuing efforts of the United States
government to reach a solution to the crisis." 29 Initially, the judge most
occupied with the litigation, Judge Duffy in the Southern District of
New York, acceded to the government's request for a stay.30 He would
later tire of the government's constant delaying tactics.31
By March 5, 1980, one hundred and fifty-nine separate actions had
been filed against Iran and Iranian entities, and certain Iranian defend-
ants proposed consolidation of all cases before a multi-district litigation
panel.32 Thereafter the litigation goals of the United States and the
Iranian defendants came to be nearly identical: to delay the lawsuits
and retard the claimants' stalking of judgments. Not surprisingly, the
United States supported the Iranians' request for multi-district
consolidation.
33
For their part, most major banks offered no opposition to the joint
Iran-United States strategy of consolidation and delay.3 4 The U.S.
government's interest in staying proceedings developed only after most
major banks had asserted set-off rights and filed attachments. The offi-
cial move to stay the litigation, moreover, coincided with the then
evolving opinion of certain bankers that the Iranian crisis should be
settled by private negotiation, not by public litigation. 35 The banks
were in an enviable position. Not only did they hold "frozen" assets
that could be placed in short-term investments at high yields or used to
satisfy reserve requirements (freeing other assets for investment); their
loans to Iran were secured by set-offs and attachments superior to those
England Merchant Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., note 33
infra.
29. Id
30. See, e.g., New England Merchants Nat'1 Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Trans-
mission Co., No. 79-6380 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1980) (order granting initial continuance).
3 1. See note 44 & text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
32. Motion for an Order Transferring Related Action, In re Litigation Involving the
State of Iran, No. 425 (J.P.M.D.L. May 7, 1980).
33. Suggestion of Interest of United States, New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran
Power Generation and Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modfioed sub
am. Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, I01 S. Ct. 3154 (1981) (90 consolidated cases).
34. See, e.g., Response of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Response of Bankers Trust
Co., Memorandum of the Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Response of Citibank, N.A., In re
Litigation Involving the State of Iran, No. 425 (J.P.M.D.L. May 7, 1980).
35. The bankers conveyed these impressions privately to government officials. See 1981
Hearings, supra note 17, at 66-67 (statement of Hans H. Angermueller).
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of most plaintiffs. In short, with delay the banks made money.36 The
banks had the added satisfaction of knowing that their claims were
most likely to be paid should the litigation go forward: their loans were
liquidated, their services were necessary should Iran desire to return to
international markets, and their lawsuits were likely to survive sover-
eign immunity defenses by Iran.37
Despite this congruence of interests, the Judicial Panel on Multi-dis-
trict Litigation denied Iran's first request for consolidation of the
cases.38 Undeterred, various Iranian commercial banks, other Iranian
defendants, and the Islamic Republic of Iran all fied new motions for
consolidation before a multi-district panel.39
Once again, the United States supported Iran's strategy to transfer
the cases, stating that "consolidation of these subgroups will also fur-
ther the foreign policy and international relations interests of the
United States."'40 And again, the great majority of major United States
banks sided with Iran and the United States, at least to the extent of
supporting the consolidation of the syndicated loan cases.4' The banks'
cooperation in May, 1980 with the litigation strategies of the U.S. and
Iran stemmed in part from the banks' part in generating private negoti-
ations with Iran. Citibank's attorney would later tell the Senate Bank-
36. During the freeze, banks holding Iranian assets were not required to pay interest on
these accounts, despite a proposal by the Treasury Department that they do o. COMMITrEE
PRINT, supra note 17, at 17-20. Under the final agreement struck with Iran, banks ultimately
were required to transfer the funds to Iran, along with interest from November 14, 1979, at
"commercially reasonable rates." 46 Fed. Reg. 26,477 (1981) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R.
§ 535.213(a)). However, the administrative interpretation of "commercially reasonable
rates" allowed only modest interest to Iran: for time or savings deposits, the rate provided in
the deposit agreement; for demand accounts, no interest; for other accounts, any rate agreed
to by the bank and Iran. 46 Fed. Reg. 30,341 (1981) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. § 535.440).
37. Section 4(a) of the FSIA denies sovereign immunity for actions based on commercial
activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
Iran's commercial loans from United States banks would be less eligible for sovereign im-
munity than, for example, Iranian commercial activities in Iran that-caused injury in Iran to
American citizens. Compare Upton v. The Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978),
af§'d without opinion, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (injuries to American citizens in Iran by
reason of Iranian government negligence in maintaining airport facility failed to meet "di-
rect effect" test of § 4(a)), with H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6609 (loan to foreign government is commercial
activity).
38. In re Litigation Involving the State of Iran, No. 425 (J.P.M.D.L. May 7, 1980) (mov-
ants failed to show sufficient commonality of facts).
39. Motion for an Order Transferring Related Actions, In re Litigation Involving the
State of Iran (II), No. 435 (J.P.M.D.L. July 8, 1980).
40. Amicus Curiae Memorandum of the United States at 1, In re Litigation Involving
the State of Iran (II), No. 435 (J.P.M.D.L. July 8, 1980).
41. Brief of Certain New York Plaintiffs in Support of Motion to Transfer, In re Litiga-
tion Involving the State of Iran (II), No. 435 (J.P.M.D.L. July 8, 1980) (plaintiffs were Bank-
ers Trust, Citibank, Chase Manhattan, Irving Trust, and Manufacturers Hanover Trust).
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ing Committee that, on May 2, 1980, Citibank, the banks' lead
negotiator, was contacted by a German attorney acting on behalf of
Iran and seeking an economic solution of the Iranian difficulties. With
the United States government's blessings, Citibank met with Iranian
officials, and over the next eight months discussed various settlement
proposals. 42 These private negotiations complemented Citibank's co-
operative stance in the litigation. Spurning the coordinated efforts of
the major banks, the United States, and the government of Iran, the
multi-district panel once again rejected the motions for transfer.
43
Despite the continued requests for stays by the government,44 the liti-
gation inched forward in at least eighteen judicial districts across the
country. While the domestic litigation crept ahead, the banks contin-
ued their private negotiations with Iranian officials. One initial plan,
drafted in May, 1980 and discussed for nearly six months, called for
immediate payment in full by Iran of liquidated claims (including most
42. 1981 Hearings, supra note 17, at 68-72 (statement of John E. Hoffman, Jr.). The
banks and the United States government had personal ties as well. One of the government's
chief negotiators was Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Carswell, formerly Hoffman's part-
ner at Shearman & Sterling. See Nat'l L.J., Feb. 9, 1981, at 31, col. 1; at 32, col. 3. See also
CoMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 17, at 30-31, 39.
43. In re Litigation Involving the State of Iran (II), No. 435 (J.P.M.D.L. July 8, 1980)
(order denying motion for transfer of related actions) (movants again failed to demonstrate
sufficient commonality of facts).
44. A number of courts acceded to the United States' requests for stays. See, e.g., In re
Related Iranian Cases, Nos. C-79-3542 RFP et seq. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 1980); Am. Int'l
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 79-3298 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 1980); New En-
gland Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., No. 80-1071
(1st Cir. Oct. 30, 1980). See also Nat'l Airmotive v. Gov't and State of Iran, 499 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1980) (denying indefinite stay but granting 70-day stay). Other courts, how-
ever, denied the United States' motion to stay proceedings and permitted the litigation to
continue. See, e.g., Blount Bros. Corp. v. The Gov't of Iran, No. 79-5094 (E.D. La. Aug. 20,
1980). The United States sought a stay in a leading Iranian assets case, New England
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., on July 28, 1980.
The United States asserted that continued litigation would "create a serious risk of prejudic-
ing the continuing efforts of the United States government to resolve the hostage crisis."
Suggestion of Interest of the United States, New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran
Power Generation and Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified sub
nom. Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 3154 (1981). In addition to its public filing, the United States submitted a
secret declaration to Judge Duffy to be considered only in camera and ex parte. While
stating that he had the "utmost respect for the views of these officials" as expressed in the in
camera remarks, Judge Duffy rejected the request for a stay, finding that foreign policy
considerations should not outweigh "the logic of the law." New England Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 133 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), modpfied sub nom. Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 3154 (1981). Judge Duffy asserted that, on the contrary,
"the reasoned determination of the problems presented to me will, if anything, clarify the
issues which may become involved in the overall foreign policy of this nation and help
others to more fully realize that this nation is founded on law and legal principles." Id at
133-34.
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bank loans) and settlement of unliquidated claims by means of a claims
commission. Citibank informed the United States government of the
progress of this plan, "Plan C," and of all other discussions held with
Iran. Indeed, Citibank told Iranian officials that any private settlement
would require United States government approval and that the United
States would insist on the safe return of the hostages.4 5 At this point,
however, Citibank's negotiations did not derail the litigation.
IV. The Early Issues
As the number of plaintiffs suing Iran or Iranian entities swelled to
about four hundred, courts turned to the merits. Even if the United
States government had not persistently prevented the courts from con-
sidering substantive issues, litigants would have encountered serious
difficulties in suing Iran. Several issues were particularly worrisome:
did United States courts have jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against
the government of Iran, its agencies, and/or instrumentalities? Was the
Islamic Republic of Iran responsible for the debts, contract breaches, or
other liabilities of various Iranian instrumentalities, under an alter-ego
or "Big Mullah" theory? Could United States courts issue prejudgment
orders of attachment against assets in which Iran, its agencies, or in-
strumentalities had an interest? The United States and Iran often
found themselves closely aligned in addressing these issues.
A. Jurisdiction Over Claims
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),46 defines
both the circumstances in which a foreign state will be entitled to sover-
eign immunity and the conditions under which parties can maintain
lawsuits against foreign states in the courts of the United States.47 The
FSIA codifies the "restrictive" principle of sovereign immunity. Under
that principle, the immunity of a foreign state is restricted to suits in-
volving a foreign state's public acts (lure imperii) and does not extend to
suits based on its commercial or private acts (lure gestionis).4 8
45. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 17, at 69 (statement of John E. Hoffman, Jr.); CoM-
MITrEE PRINT, supra note 17, at 31-33.
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), & 1602 etseq. (1976).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604.
48. This distinction was first adopted by the Department of State in the Tate letter of
1952, see Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984
(1954), and to this day it has generally been followed by United States courts and by the
Executive Branch. See Sugarman v. AeroMexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980).
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The FSIA denies jurisdictional immunity to a foreign state in any
cause of action founded upon that state's commercial activity in the
United States; or upon an act that the state performed in the United
States in connection with its commercial activity elsewhere; or upon an
act that the state performed outside the United States but which causes
a direct effect in the United States. Litigants suing Iran or Iranian enti-
ties drew upon this provision of the FSIA for subject matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction. 49
Plaintiffs' success in proving jurisdiction over Iranian defendants de-
pended on the facts of each case. InAmerican International Group, Inc.
v. Islamic Republic ofIran,50 the court held that Iran's failure to com-
pensate a group of insurance companies nationalized by Iran caused a
"direct effect" within the meaning of the FSIA, § 1605(a)(2), thereby
establishing jurisdiction in the United States. 5' Similarly, numerous
visits to the United States by an Iranian entity's agents to review and
inspect the progress made on a contract was found to constitute suffi-
cient minimum contacts in Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Social Se-
49. The FSIA provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States, in any case ....
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
In addition to the jurisdiction provided by § 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA, some plaintiffs as-
serted jurisdiction over Iran by relying on two other sections of that Act: § 1604, which
provides that the FSIA is "subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act," and § 1605(a)(1), which provides that
a nation may waive its sovereign immunity. Some plaintiffs offered the 1955 Treaty of Am-
ity as such a waiver under § 1605(a)(1). Article XI, § 4 of the Treaty provides:
No enterprise of either High Contracting Party, including corporations, associations,
and government agencies and instrumentalities, which is publicly owned or controlled,
shall, if it is engaged in commercial, industrial, shipping, or other business activities
within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy, either for
itself or its property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution of judgment, or
other liability to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein.
Treaty of Amity, supra note 1, 8 U.S.T. at 909.
However, in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981
(N.D. Ill. 1980), the court observed that this clause of the Treaty was simply "designed to
put American companies in an equal competitive position with foreign state-owned enter-
prises expanding their operation into the United States-not to transform U.S. courts into
international courts of claims for extra-territorial suits against these foreign enterprises." Id
at 984. In short, ruled that court, the Treaty of Amity does not address jurisdiction, and
therefore only the FSIA is controlling on jurisdictional issues.
50. 493 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1980).
51. Id at 526.
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curit Organization ofthe Government of Iran.52 To the same effect was
Behring v. Imperial Iranian Air Force,53 where the court found that by
maintaining a New York office, and by negotiating and executing a
contract in New York that obliged plaintiff Behring to prepare goods
subsequently shipped to Iran in Iranian Air Force cargo planes, the Air
Force had waived its jurisdictional immunity.54 These decisions re-
quired rather straightforward analyses of the nature and extent of the
defendants' conduct. To summarize, courts have found authority to act
where the activity in question was commercial (lure gestionis), as op-
posed to governmental (lure imperfi), and where it was sufficiently con-
nected to the United States. For the most part, while the United States
sought to delay rulings, it did not take substantive positions on jurisdic-
tion, leaving plaintiffs to their one-on-one battles with Iran.
55
52. No. CA 3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 1980), appeal dismissed, 616 F.2d 566 (5th
Cir. 1980).
53. 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979).
54. Id at 390.
55. The United States, of course, could not ignore the FSIA's provisions for jurisdiction
over foreign defendants. However, it did try to ensure that the Act would be narrowly con-
strued. Prior to the seizure of the hostages, the United States filed an amicus curiae brief
that asserted that the sovereign government of Iran and its non-commercial agencies were
entitled to immunity from suit under the FSIA and the 1955 Treaty. The United States
considered even Iran's commercial enterprises to be immune from prejudgment attachment
under the Treaty of Amity. Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 24-26, Electronic
Data Systems Corp. Iran v. Social Security Organization of the Gov't of Iran, 610 F.2d 94
(2d Cir. 1979). The day after the President's freeze order, the Justice Department reiterated
the views set out in its amicus brief. Letter from Alice Daniel, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, to A. Daniel Fusaro, Esq., Clerk of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Nov. 15,
1979) (on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order). As the hostage crisis dragged
on, however, the United States represented that it took a neutral position on sovereign im-
munity questions, in, for example, an affidavit of Treasury Secretary Miller attached to the
Suggestion of Interest of the United States filed in all New York assets cases on October 16,
1980. Yet this supposed "neutrality" was belied by the government's own pleadings, which
suggested that Iran indeed was entitled to sovereign immunity from suit and prejudgment
attachment.
Moreover, the issues before this court, particularly those relating to the validity of the
sovereign immunity defense, have an important bearing on U.S. relations with other
countries, especially those of governments or central banks which have substantial
holdings in the U.S. The U.S. Government encourages such holdings. In deciding
where to hold their funds, governments and central banks are influenced by the availa-
bility of the sovereign immunity defense as insulation against attack. However, the
danger of conveying inappropriate signals to the Government of Iran by any brief sub-
mitted by the U.S. Government prevents it from presenting its views to this or other
courts in which important issues, such as the issue of Iran's sovereign immunity, have
been raised.
Suggestion of Interest of the United States in, e.g., New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v.
Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified
sub nom. Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 3154 (1981).
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B. Liability of the Central Government
Very few of the Iranian cases proceeded to a resolution of liability,
but one liability question did arise repeatedly in'pretrial skirmishes:
the vicarious responsibility of the government of Iran for acts of Ira-
nian instrumentalities, agencies, or controlled corporations.
Many plaintiffs argued that particular Iranian instrumentalities or
banks had no separate juridical identity, because assets and liabilities
of all Iranian agencies and instrumentalities had merged following the
revolution. For example, in one case,56 the plaintiff sued the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran and twenty-eight Iranian banks. The os-
tensible basis for naming the Iranian banks as defendants was "a unity
of interest and ownership between Iran and all other defendants...
such that any individuality and separateness between these entities
have ceased and each of said defendants is the alter ego of Iran. '57 In
another case,58 the plaintiff sued not only several Iranian banks but all
other agencies and instrumentalities of Iran as well. Plaintiff argued
that all of these entities were jointly liable because "their corporate
identities have been disregarded, their management joined apad con-
fused, and their assets intermingled so that each defendant is now the
alter-ego of the other and all defendants now constitute a single gov-
ernmental enterprise.
' '59
In these cases, plaintiffs asserted that as a direct result of the Iranian
revolution, and Iranian legislation passed since that revolution, Iranian
banks and other instrumentalities had merged into one economic sys-
tem. This approach by plaintiffs has been dubbed the "Big Mullah"
theory6o and is analogous to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
At the heart of plaintiffs' argument was that this "Big Mullah," which
had been created by the converging of various defendants' interests,
controlled all Iranian assets; for that reason it should be held responsi-
ble for all outstanding liabilities as well.
6'
The "Big Mullah" theory received a modicum of judicial recognition
inAmerican International Group, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran,
62
56. Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, No. 79-04918 (C.D. Cal.
1981), afldsub no=. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
57. Id, Complaint at 10.
58. GTE Int'l, Inc. v. Telecommunication Co. of Iran, No. 80-0933 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb.
15, 1980), consolidated sub nom. New England Merchants Natl Bank v. Iran Power Genera-
tion and Transmission Co., note 33 supra.
59. Id, Amended Complaint at 1 26.
60. 1981 Hearings, supra note 17, at 79 (panel discussion on "Black Hole" and "Big
Mullah" theories).
61. Id at 78-79. See notes 54-57 supra.
62. 493 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1980).
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where the court ruled that the government of Iran was "inseparable"
from the Central Insurance of Iran, an enterprise engaged in issuing
reinsurance; the two defendants were found to be "alter-ego[s]. ' '63 The
"Big Mullah" approach was a desperate, but necessary, strategy for
American plaintiffs, who had seen their Iranian contractual partners
swallowed up by the revolutionary government.
C. Prejudgment Attachment Issues
The most heated battles in the early days of the Iranian assets litiga-
tion were fought over the plaintiffs' right to prejudgment attachment of
Iranian assets. The FSIA provides that the assets of a foreign state, its
agencies, and instrumentalities are immune from this type of attach-
ment unless two conditions are satisfied: there must be an explicit
waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment, and the purpose of
the attachment must be to secure satisfaction of a judgment that has
been or may be entered.64
Many plaintiffs offered Article XI of the 1955 Treaty of Amity65 as a
waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment.66 Few succeeded.
In Behring International, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force,67 the court
acknowledged that the waiver provision in Article XI, 4 of the Treaty,
waiving immunity from "taxation, suit, execution of judgment, or other
liability," did not constitute an explicit waiver of immunity from pre-
judgment attachment.68 The court found instead that this section of the
Treaty could be considered an implicit waiver of immunity, and that an
implicit waiver is sufficient. The FSIA's requirement of an explicit
waiver was not applicable, according to the Behring court, because the
FSIA itself provides that it is "subject to existing international agree-
ments,"' 69 and is therefore subordinate to the previously negotiated
Treaty.70 Using this approach, the Court determined that the Treaty's
waiver provision should be interpreted using ordinary principles of
contract construction, not by applying the narrow waiver requirements
of the FSIA.71 Only one other court has agreed with the Behring
63. Id. at 526.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1976).
65. See note I supra.
66. See note 49 supra.
67. 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979).
68. Id at 393.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
70. 475 F. Supp. at 393.





Most courts concluded that the Treaty of Amity was neither an ex-
plicit waiver of Iran's immunity from prejudgment attachment under
the FSIA, nor, even assuming that the FSIA was subordinate to the
Treaty, an implicit waiver under ordinary principles of contract con-
struction. In Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Company,
73
Judge Duffy found no waiver of immunity in the 1955 Treaty. He later
affirmed that interpretation in the leading Iranian assets case, New En-
gland Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmis-
sion Co. 
74
While Judge Duffy found no waiver of immunity from prejudgment
attachment in the Treaty of Amity, he accepted one of plaintiffs secon-
dary arguments: that the President's action under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)75 in issuing the Iranian As-
sets Regulations "unequivocally suspended" Iran's immunity from pre-
judgment attachment.76 Judge Duffy concluded that:
72. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 525 (P.D.C.
1980), vacated, No. 80-1779 et al. (D.C. Cir. May 22, 1981).
73. 478 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
74. 502 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modfed sub nom. Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran
Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 3154 (1981). Judge
Duffy's reasoning on this point was accepted in E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
491 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1980), and in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. I11. 1980).
75. The IEEPA provides that when the United States is confronted "with any unusual
and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States," the
President may declare a national emergency. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (Supp. III 1979). On
declaring such an emergency:
The President may ...
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking
institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest
of any foreign country or a national thereof;
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any ac-
quisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importa-
tion or exportation of or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign coun-
try or a national thereof has any interest;
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
76. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission
Co., 502 F. Supp. 120, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), mod/ted sub nom. Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran
Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 3154 (1981). The key
word in Judge Duffy's opinion was "suspend." In effect, Judge Duffy ruled that the Presi-
dent's freeze only temporarily suspended immunity from prejudgment attachment, but did
not confer any lasting right to assets. As foreign policy circumstances changed, therefore,
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• . . the Emergency Powers Act permits the President to nullify and void
any rights and privileges a foreign nation may have with respect to assets
within the United States. Thus, there can be no doubt that by enacting
the Emergency Powers Act, Congress intended to permit the President to
nullify and void or suspend a sovereign immunity from prejudgment
attachment.
77
The Duffy opinion, in allowing plaintiffs to secure prejudgment at-
tachments, was to be the non-banking plaintiffs' greatest victory and,
conversely, the United States' outstanding defeat in the litigation. In
this ruling, Judge Duffy not only rejected yet another request for a stay
by the United States, but determined that the United States govern-
ment's own conduct in freezing Iranian assets and issuing regulations
authorizing prejudgment attachments had allowed the litigious drama
to play on. While since the freeze the United States had not explicitly
urged the courts to deny prejudgment attachments, there was little
doubt that the United States thought Iran immune.
78
V. Up the Appellate Ladder
Following these twin setbacks, the United States sought to intervene
formally before Judge Duffy in order to seek appellate review of the
denial of stay. Once again, the United States filed public and private
declarations of the Secretaries of State and Treasury, asserting that fur-
ther proceedings would risk prejudicing the United States' efforts to
resolve the hostage crisis.79 Although in November, 1980, he denied
the motions, Judge Duffy's colorful and caustic opinion gave the
United States more than it asked for; he stated that the President could
stay all the litigation without leave of court.
The only basis for intervention is a showing of some need by the
the Executive could and did retract his limited tolerance of private access to foreign assets.
Under this ruling, the attachments had not immobilized the assets any more than had the
freeze, but served only to establish the claimants' pecking order.
77. Id. at 130. In contrast to Judge Duffy's ruling, the court in E-Systems Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 491 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1980), ruled that the Treasury regulations
under the IEEPA had not displaced the FSIA grant of immunity from prejudgment attach-
ment. The court concluded that "[i]f the Treasury Department wishes to abrogate the ex-
isting law of prejudgment attachment of assets of foreign countries as to Iran and its entities,
it could do so in a clearer fashion. And because its authority is not without question, it must
do so." ld at 1303.
78. See note 55 supra.
79. Judge Duffy, perhaps weary of the United States' unrelenting filings, refused to ac-
cept the proferred in camera submissions, ruling that "[t]he previous such submissions did
not contain anything which has not been printed in most newspapers and news magazines of
general circulation." New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and
Transmission Co., No. 79-6380 (KTD), Mem. and Order at 4 n.1 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 5, 1980)
(denying leave to intervene).
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Executive Department to intervene. There is no such need. The situation
whereby the President invoked his extraordinary powers under the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq., in
effect, suspended all litigation involving the frozen Iranian assets. These
lawsuits are permitted by a general license issued by the Executive, 31
C.F.R. Part 535. That license can be suspended by the Executive acting
alone. Such a suspension would effectively stay all this litigation. Thus,
the Executive has within its sole power the means to obtain all of the
relief it now seeks. To request this court to stay proceedings for which the
Executive Branch has issued a special license, revocable at will, is explica-
ble only in terms that could not properly be expressed in a judicial
forum.
80
All parties promptly appealed Judge Duffy's ruling.8' The Iranian
defendants sought review of Judge Duffy's orders denying immunity
from prejudgment attachment and providing for substituted service by
telex. Many claimants petitioned for reversal of Judge Duffy's ruling
that under the FSIA the Iranian defendants were immune from pre-
judgment attachment.
82
The United States sought review of Judge Duffy's denial of its re-
quest for a stay. As in the past, an odd alliance formed on that issue:
80. Id at 2-3 (footnote omitted). In a subsequent opinion, Judge Duffy tempered his
suggestion that the President could control the litigation. He observed that the plaintiffs'
attachments obtained under the general license:
vested in these plaintiffs certain inchoate rights to the frozen Iranian assets. Although
these rights may not now be fixed and certain, they are still rights in property. As a
result, the cancellation of these rights by the executive department may only be accom-
plished by due process of law. It is not necessary for this court at present to delineate
the possible methods by which the plaintiffs' rights may be cancelled within constitu-
tional bounds.
New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., No.
79-6380 (KTD), Mem. and Order at 5-6 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 22, 1980) (order certifying ques-
tions for appeal) (footnotes omitted). Judge Duffy did find, however, that the Executive
Department could suspend the attachment license "for a reasonable time." Id at 6. The
suggestion that the plaintiffs would be entitled to some "due process" from the government
perhaps dissuaded the government from retracting the license as Judge Duffy had suggested
in his November 5, 1980 order. See note 79 supra. Moreover as a political matter, the
government was not then prepared publicly to terminate plaintiffs' rights without some con-
cession from Iran. See COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 17, at 18.
81. Notice of Appeal by United States, New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran
Power Generation and Transmission Co.; Joint Notice of Appeal by Certain Iranian De-
fendants, New England Merchants Nat'l. Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission
Co. No. 80-3063 (2d Cir., Dec. 23, 1980 & Jan. 5, 1981).
82. Judge Duffy eventually certified five questions for appeal: (1) Did the President's
freeze regulations dissolve defendants' immunity from prejudgment attachment? (2) If so,
did the President have power to do so under the IEEPA? (3) If so, is the IEEPA constitu-
tional? (4) Are the defendants entitled to immunity from prejudgment attachment under
the FSIA, the Treaty of Amity, and/or because of the severance of diplomatic relations
between the United States and Iran? (5) Was service by telex order appropriate? New En-
gland Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., No. 79-6380
(S.D.N.Y., Dec. 22, 1980) (order certifying questions for appeal).
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Iranian defendants and most of the major New York banks informed
the Second Circuit that they did not oppose the United States' request
for a stay. Indeed, the banks observed that a stay was appropriate
while appeals were pending.83 This alliance was forged in part by the
intense negotiations among the banks, the United States, and the Irani-
ans in the previous seven months. In fact, on January 5, 1981, as the
banks filed their memorandum with the court, they were on the eve of a
marathon negotiating session with Iranian officials that culminated in a
financial settlement highly favorable to the banks.8 4
VI. A Deal is Struck
Just as President Carter's term rushed to a close-and just as the
initial briefs were fied in the Second Circuit-the United States, Iran,
and the major banks struck a deal. In exchange for Iran's release of the
hostages, the United States agreed to quash private litigants' attach-
ments, to unfreeze the assets, and to ban further litigation. Banks re-
ceived nearly complete satisfaction of their claims. For non-banking
plaintiffs, however, the agreement was less gratifying. Stripped of their
post-freeze attachments, these claimants at best could seek interna-
tional arbitration; at worst, they would be relegated to Iranian courts.
The deal bore a striking resemblance to "Plan C" drafted by Citibank
in May, 1980.85
As a leading business publication succinctly reported: the banks
"appear to be the major winners in the settlement." Of just under $8
billion in blocked Iranian assets transferred from the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, United States government accounts, and foreign
branches of United States banks, $3.7 billion went immediately to pay
off twelve large United States banks and their foreign partners in syndi-
cated loans to Iran. An additional $1.4 billion was held in escrow by
the Central Bank of Algeria to pay off unsyndicated loans and any dis-
putes arising from the syndicated settlements.8 6
83. Memorandum of Law of Certain Respondents, New England Merchants Nat'l Bank
v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., No. 80-3063 (2d Cir., Jan. 5, 1981). The
banks did not adopt the United States' logic that a stay was appropriate because of foreign
policy considerations; instead they urged that a stay would promote judicial economy: Sec-
ond Circuit review could make further proceedings below unnecessary. Eventually, the Sec-
ond Circuit stayed proceedings in the District Court pending appeal. New England
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., No. 80-3063 (2d
Cir. Dec. 23, 1980 & Jan. 5, 1981) (orders granting and continuing stays).
84. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 17, at 70-72 (statement of John E. Hoffman, Jr.).
85. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra; COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 17, at 35.
86. Bus. WEEK, Feb. 2, 1981, at 14. The syndicated banks' recovery was so impressive
that Business Week observed: "Some of the banks may actually have come out of the inter-
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The heart of the Iran-United States settlement is found in two docu-
ments: the "Assets Agreement" and the "Arbitration Agreement. T87 In
the Assets Agreement, the United States agreed to prohibit all pending
and future United States court actions involving claims of U.S. persons
and institutions against Iran, to nullify attachments and judgments in
those suits, and to direct those claims to international arbitration.
88
The United States agreed to transfer to an escrow account Iran's gold
and securities stored at the Federal Reserve and all Iranian deposits
and securities in overseas banking offices of United States banks.89 In
addition, the United States agreed to "act to bring about the transfer to
the Central Bank [of Iran], within six months, of all Iranian deposits
and securities" in domestic United States banks.90 Some of those de-
posits were to be accumulated in a separate escrow account, until a
balance of $1 billion was reached, and would be used solely to secure
the payment of commercial claims against Iran.9' Iran agreed to main-
tain a balance of $500 million in that account until all arbitration
awards were satisfied.92 Finally, the United States agreed to assist in
Iran's litigation against the former Shah's assets93 and-to ban hostages'
claims against Iran.94
In the Arbitration Agreement, Iran and the United States agreed to
establish an international arbitral tribunal whose awards would be en-
forceable worldwide.95 The signatories chose not to rely on already
existing institutions, such as the United States Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission or International Chamber of Commerce arbitration
panels. Instead, they created a new body with exclusive jurisdiction
over all United States nationals' claims against Iran except those claims
arising under contracts requiring that disputes be resolved solely by
minable hostage crisis in better shape than they went into it." Id The syndicated banks'
success was not unanticipated, given their closeness to the negotiations. Nor was it wholly
unreasonable: the banks held the bulk of the assets, and, in contrast to claims of other
plaintiffs, the banks' claims were liquidated and undisputed. In addition, Iran was surely in
greater need of future services from the banks than from most other American businesses.
87. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
[hereinafter cited as Assets Agreement] and Declaration of the Government of the Demo-
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Govern-
ment of the United States and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran [hereinafter
cited as Arbitration Agreement] (Jan. 19, 1981) (on file with The Yale Journal of World
Public Order).







95. Arbitration Agreement, supra note 87, Arts. II; IV, 1 3.
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Iranian courts.96 The tribunal is to consist of at least nine members,
three appointed by the United States, three appointed by Iran, and the
remaining three appointed by mutual agreement.97 Panels are to de-
cide cases on the basis of "respect for law," including principles of
commercial and international law and contractual choice of law
provisions.98
Fearing that the agreements would not guarantee redress of all legiti-
mate claims, 99 some non-banking claimants announced their reluctance
to forego litigation without further assurance that the arbitral tribunal
would act promptly and fairly.100 Indeed, several aggressive non-bank-
ing plaintiffs foreswore the mandate to arbitrate and immediately chal-
lenged the settlement.
In Electronic Data Systems Corporation v. Social Security Organiza-
tion of The Government of Iran,'0 l plaintiff EDS challenged President
Carter's final decree, Executive Order 12,279,102 ordering the transfer
of assets from domestic banking institutions to the Federal Reserve
Board in preparation for their eventual transfer to Iran. EDS had filed
suit and obtained a prejudgment writ of attachment well in advance of
the November, 1979 freeze; and, prior to the conclusion of the United
States-Iran agreement, EDS had won a judgment against Iranian de-
fendants for approximately $20 million. On these unique facts the
court preliminarily enjoined the Secretary of the Treasury from requir-
ing domestic banks to transfer assets to the Federal Reserve Bank.
The Executive asserted that three separate sources gave the President
the authority to issue Executive Order 12,279: the IEEPA, the Hostage
Act,103 and Article II of the Constitution. The Court examined each of
96. Id Art. II, 11.
97. Id Art. III, 11.
98. Id Art. V.
99. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, one attorney estimated
that total claims exceed $3 billion by a "significant margin" and therefore even if Iran main-
tains $1 billion in the arbitration fund, claimants could receive less than 33 cents on the
dollar. Daily Executive Rep. (BNA), Feb. 18, 1981, at L-5.
100. Letter from Lawrence W. Newman, Chairman, New York Plaintiffs' Steering Com-
mittee in Iranian Litigation, to David J. Anderson, Dept. of Justice, Richard Davis, Dept. of
the Treasury, Mark B. Feldman, Dept. of State, Larry Sims, Dept. of Justice, John N.
Walker, Dept. of the Treasury (Feb. 17, 1981) (on file with The Yale Journal of WorldPublec
Order). As of this writing (September, 1981), some commentators-including the former
State Department attorney representing the United States in negotiations of United States
claims with Iran-estimate that the tribunal will take ten years to award even partial com-
pensation to claimants. Daily Executive Rep. (BNA), Aug. 20, 1981, at L-1.
101. 508 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Tex. 1981), a.d in part, rev'd in part, Nos. 79-2641 el al.
(5th Cir. July 15, 1981). See note 5 supra.
102. 46 Fed. Reg. 7919, 10897 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 535.504).
103. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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these, and found them wanting, ruling that there was "a substantial
likelihood that the Executive Order was not validly promulgated dur-
ing President Carter's term of office."'' 4 The Court found that the
IEEPA did not authorize the President to vest himself with custody and
control of the assets. The statutory language and legislative history au-
thorized the President to "freeze but not seize" assets.' 0 5 In addition,
the IEEPA could not be construed as reflecting congressional intent to
grant the President power to nullify or void attachments or judgments,
which are valid exercises of judicial power by Article III courts.'
0 6
Similarly, the Hostage Act, characterized as "an aging statute," pro-
vided no power to nullify valid orders and judgments of the Judicial
Branch. 0
7
Finally, the court ruled that the "naked [Article II] powers of the
Presidency" 0 8 did not permit the Executive Branch to strip plaintiff of
its interest in the attached assets. Article II gives the Executive no au-
thority to nullify a court's already rendered judgment, 0 9 and the Exec-
utive usurped congressional power by interfering with the federal
courts' exercise of jurisdiction authorized by Congress in the FSIA. 0
In addition, the Executive's action interfered with plaintiff's property
interests in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.1 In short, the Court ruled that the Executive Order inter-
fered with the constitutional powers of the Judiciary and Congress and
violated the constitutional rights of individuals. Other lower courts
later criticized and distinguished the EDS holding."
2
Despite the commercial claimants' public criticisms of the accords,
the EDS opinion, and the incoming Administration's initial hesitancy
to ratify anything negotiated by President Carter, President Reagan
adopted the agreement.' 13 The United States did, however, make a
modest effort to placate ordinary commercial creditors with claims
against Iran. On February 24, 1981, President Reagan issued Execu-
104. Id at 1359.
105. Id at 1361.
106. Id
107. Id at 1361-62.
108. Id at 1362.
109. Id at 1362-63.
110. Id at 1364.
Ill. Id at 1363-64. Accord, Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Miller, 504 F. Supp. 552, 558 (D.N.J.
1980) (U.S. might use assets attached by creditor to settle crisis, but creditor is entitled to
compensation from the U.S.).
112. See text accompanying notes 119-126 infra.
113. Removing any doubt about the effectiveness of President Carter's "midnight" Exec-
utive Orders, President Reagan ratified them all. Exec. Order No. 12,294, § 8, 46 Fed. Reg.
14,111 (1981).
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tive Order 12,294, suspending-rather than dismissing outright-all
claims in litigation that would be presented to the proposed arbitral
tribunal. The suspension of a claim will be lifted, and the claim dis-
charged, only if the tribunal determines either that a claimant is not
entitled to recovery or is entitled to recovery and has been paid in full.
To enforce the agreements and the Carter and Reagan Executive Or-
ders, the Office of Foreign Assets Control issued revised assets regula-
tions.114 Among other provisions, the regulations withdraw all licenses
for attachments, and nullify any right obtained by attachments received
after November 14, 1979.115 In addition, the regulations implement
President Reagan's Executive Order suspending rather than dismissing
claims pending the decision of the international arbitral tribunal. 16 As
a practical matter, the suspension has little significance: a litigant
whose attachments are quashed finds slight solace in a suspended right
to litigate against phantom assets." 17
VII. A Final Litigious Flurry
Before the dust could settle on the new regulations, litigants returned
to court. On February 26, 1981, the United States filed renewed sug-
gestions of interest throughout the nation, asking courts to follow Presi-
dent Reagan's lead by suspending litigation and vacating attachments.
The United States asserted that the President had plenary power to re-
turn foreign assets and to terminate private litigation under Article II of
114. 46 Fed. Reg. 14,330 (1981) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. § 535).
115. 46 Fed. Reg. 14,337 (1981) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. § 535.218(a)). However, the
regulations seem to permit any creditor who obtained an attachment, injunction, or other
interestprior to Nov. 14, 1979, when the initial freeze was imposed, to maintain that attach-
ment. 46 Fed. Reg. 14,337 (1981) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. § 535.218(b)). While this
regulation should protect the attachment obtained by plaintiff in the EDS litigation, it does
not appear to protect a litigant's unsatisfied judgment. Indeed, the EDS plaintiff, despite its
judgment, is obligated to appear before the claims tribunal. Electronic Data Systems Corp.
Iran v. Social Security Organization of the Government of Iran, Nos. 79-2641 etal (5th Cir.
Jul. 15, 1981). However, if a judgment has been satisfied, the claimant need not return the
sums collected. For example, on March 4, 1981, the government publicly acknowledged that
the plaintiff in Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Miller, 504 F. Supp. 552 (D.N.J. 1980), having reached a
settlement with Iran prior to the November, 1979 freeze, was entitled to collect sums previ-
ously deposited by Iran in a settlement account. Daily Executive Rep. (BNA), Mar. 4, 1981,
at L-6.
116. 46 Fed. Reg. 14,332 (1981) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. § 535.222(a)).
117. The Algerian accords, and regulations enforcing them, do grant some protection to
those non-banking claimants with letter of credit problems. While those claimants must
take their underlying contractual disputes to the tribunal, in the interim their Iranian coun-
terparts cannot successfully demand payment through letters of credit running to their bene-
fit. See 31 C.F.R. § 535.568 (1980) (allowing American claimants to set up blocked accounts
to prevent American banks' payment of letter of credit to Iranian entity); Itek Corp. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Boston, 511 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Mass. 1981).
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the Constitution, the IEEPA, and the Hostage Act. Private plaintiffs, in
contrast, challenged the President's authority to vacate attachments and
to transfer litigation from United States courts to international
tribunals.
The plaintiffs contesting the accords won little support in the lower
courts. In stark contrast to the EDS opinion,"18 the district court in
Chas. T Main International, Inc. v. United States 19 concluded that the
President was empowered by the Constitution, the IEEPA, and the
FSIA to reach an agreement with a foreign government requiring the
removal of civil actions pending in United States courts to an interna-
tional tribunal. The court avoided an in-depth analysis of pertinent
authorities, stating that only the Supreme Court could resolve the
weighty issues.'
20
On appeal, the First Circuit wrote a more careful and detailed opin-
ion, but reached the same conclusion: the hostage agreements, and the
regulations enforcing them, were legal.' 2' The court ratified the ration-
ale earlier suggested by Judge Duffy in the New York suits: the IEEPA
authorized the President to freeze, although not seize, Iranian assets; it
authorized the President to issue a revocable license allowing claimants
to obtain qualified attachments; and it authorized the President to re-
voke any licensed attachment and to transfer the assets to the pre-freeze
owner.12
2
The First Circuit also upheld the President's suspension of United
States nationals' claims against Iran. That power is derived, not from
any Executive Branch authority to define the jurisdiction of courts, but
from the President's historical authority, apparently found in Art icle II
of the Constitution, to settle claims by American nationals against for-
eign governments. 23 The court dismissed as premature the frustrated
litigants' claims to compensation from the United States for the revoca-
tion of attachment licenses.'
24
At least two other courts reached the same conclusions: the freeze of
assets was lawful under the IEEPA; the conditional licensing of attach-
ments and subsequent revocation were lawful under the IEEPA; and
118. See text accompanying notes 101-112 supra.
119. 509 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Mass. 1981), af'd sub nom. Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v.
Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (Ist Cir. 1981).
120. Id at 1164.
121. Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir.
1981).
122. Id at 807-09.
123. Id at 810-13.
124. Id at 814-15.
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the suspension of litigation was lawful under the President's Article II
powers, left intact, by Congress, to settle claims of American nationals
against foreign governments.
25
In Unidyne Corp. v. Government of Iran, 26 the court also determined
that both the Constitution and the IEEPA empowered the President to
transfer foreign assets abroad and to nullify litigants' rights in those
assets. 27 The Unidyne court appeared less confident, however, about
the President's authority to terminate legal proceedings against a for-
eign nation and therefore it denied the government's motion to stay the
action. 28 Thus, while plaintiff Unidyne lost its attachment, it could
continue its suit; but this became a pyrrhic victory once the assets were
returned to Iran as provided in the accords.
VIII. Supreme Court Resolution
Just as the plaintiffs had raced eighteen months earlier to obtain at-
tachments, so did the assets litigation speed to the Supreme Court. A
substantial number of plaintiffs were certain that the Southern District
of New York litigation would present the test case, but the shuttling of
issues between Judge Duffy and the Second Circuit slowed that court's
previous furious pace.' 29
125. Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 80-1779 et al. (D.C. Cir.
May 22, 1981); Security Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Gov't and State of Iran, 513 F. Supp. 864 (C.D.
Cal. 1981).
126. 512 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Va. 1981).
127. Id at 709.
128. Id at 710-11.
129. Following Judge Duffy's certification of issues on appeal on December 22, 1980, see
note 79 supra, the Second Circuit remanded the case to Judge Duffy to select one plaintiff
out of the 90 consolidated cases and to make a clear record of the effect of the Algerian
accords on that plaintiff. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation
and Transmission Co., 646 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1981). Judge Duffy selected Marschalk Co. as
plaintiff, and subsequently issued an 89-page opinion, Marschalk Co., Inc. v. Iran Nat'l
Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Unlike his fellow jurists in the Unidyne,
Chas. T. Main, American International, and Security Pacific cases, see notes 126, 121, 72 &
125 respectively, supra, Judge Duffy concluded that the IEEPA did not authorize the Presi-
dent to revoke licensed attachment, nor did the Constitution or any statute empower the
President to suspend claims and transfer them to the international tribunal. Moreover,
Judge Duffy ruled that under the Fifth Amendment, claimants were entitled to compensa-
tion for the government's taking of their claims and attachments. Judge Duffy's conclusions
were surprising, in light of his earlier opinion suggesting that the government could freely
revoke the licensed attachments. See note 80 supra and accompanying text. The day after
Judge Duffy issued his opinion, the major banks asked the Second Circuit, which had re-
tained jurisdiction over the appeals, to certify the case to the Supreme Court because the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in another Iranian assets case, Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 101 S. Ct. 3182 (1981). The Second Circuit promptly certified three questions to the
Supreme Court for review: the legality of suspending claims, the legality of nullifying at-
tachments; and the claimants' eligibility for compensation from the government, The
Supreme Court, having already decided Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981),
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Instead, a West Coast litigant bypassed review by the court of ap-
peals and sought an extraordinary writ of certiorari. 30 The Supreme
Court granted the extraordinary writ and set the case for oral argument
on June 24, 1981.131 In their Supreme Court pleadings, the major
banks cemented their alliance with the governments of Iran and the
United States. They supported without exception every provision in
the Algerian accords, and urged the Supreme Court to approve the
President's conduct.132 Eight days after oral argument, the Supreme
Court resolved the litigation issues raised by the hostage crisis by
adopting the banks' position. 33
Justice Rehnquist opened on a highly dramatic note. "The questions
presented by this case touch fundamentally upon the manner in which
our Republic is to be governed."1 34 He described the case as:
... one more episode in the never-ending tension between the President
exercising the executive authority in a world that presents each day some
new challenge with which he must deal and the Constitution under which
we all live and which no one disputes embodies some sort of system of
checks and balances.
135
After reciting the facts, Justice Rehnquist turned to the classic analy-
sis of executive power set out in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 36 Under that approach, the
authority of a President to act is determined, in large measure, by:
(a) any express or implied authorization to act from Congress
(b) congressional silence in the face of the questioned conduct, or
(c) any demonstrations of contravening congressional will regarding
that conduct; in other words, as legislative support for the activity di-
minishes, the likelihood of unconstitutionality increases. In connection
with the Iranian crisis, the Presidential acts freezing the assets, licensing
attachments, revoking licenses, and transferring assets to Iran, fell
responded to the three certified questions by citing to that opinion: the suspension was law-
ful; the nullification was lawful; and there was no taking by nullifying attachments. The
question of a taking by suspending claims was dismissed. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp. v. Mar-
schalk Co., Inc., 101 S. Ct. 3154 (1981). In the end, despite Judge Duffy's heroic labors over
the nearly two years of litigation, his final legal analysis was rejected by the Supreme Court.
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (1976).
131. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 3132 (1981) (granting writ of certiorari).
132. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief of Certain Banks as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment, (on behalf of, inter alia, Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co., Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank, and Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co.), Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
133. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
134. 101 S. Ct. at 2977.
135. Id at 2978.
136. 343 U.S. 579, 636-38 (1952).
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within the IEEPA's grant of authority.' 37
With respect to the suspension of claims, Justice Rehnquist turned to
the second level of Justice Jackson's analysis: a "zone of twilight"
where there is no congressional authorization but at least a hint of con-
gressional acquiescence. 38 Though neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage
Act 139 could be construed as clear support for the suspension of claims,
each conveyed a sense of congressional acquiescence in the President's
conduct.' 40 The President historically has settled claims of United
States nationals against foreign governments, and both Congress and
the Supreme Court have supported particular settlements reached in
the distant and near past.' 41 Although Respondents argued that the
FSIA, enacted in 1976, expressed a congressional policy at odds with
broad claims settlement powers, the Court saw no contradiction. Jus-
tice Rehnquist found that the FSIA has no bearing on the President's
authority to settle international disputes, but speaks to a wholly sepa-
rate issue, that of sovereign immunity. 42 In short, ruled the Court, the
President's Article II "Executive power," understood in terms of a tra-
dition of congressional recognition of settlement authority, permitted
the suspension of claims. 143
IX. Conclusion
The courtroom battle for Iran's assets has now waned. At the con-
clusion of the Algerian accords, the United States banks retired from
the front, and all other litigants retreated in the face of the Supreme
Court's opinion. 44 While the litigious assault on Iran's assets has
137. 101 S. Ct. at 2982-84. For a discussion of the relevant sections of the IEEPA, see
note 75 supra. The Court cited Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 493 (1949) as allowing the
President "to maintain the foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution
of a declared national emergency." 101 S. Ct. at 2984 (1981). However, Propper arose
under the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), which, unlike the IEEPA, authorized the
vesting of title in the President. See note 11 supra.
138. 101 S. Ct. 2984-88.
139. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Previously, the Hostage Act had had
little more than a footnote history. See, e.g., Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1225 n.108
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 942 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The Act
served occasionally to allow the President to retard international travel. See Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 15 n.16 (1965).
140. 101 S. Ct. 2984-86.
141. Id at 2986-88.
142. d at 2989-90.
143. Id The Court concluded that the question of whether the suspension was a taking
was not ripe for adjudication. Id at 2991. However, it was not premature to direct claim-
ants to the Court of Claims should any claimant believe a taking had occurred because of
the suspension. ld at 2992. The Court clearly ruled that no taking had occurred because of
the revocation of the attachments. Id at 2984 n.6.
144. The banks were quick to indicate their support for the Algerian accords. In their
Vol. 7:88, 1980
Iranian Assets
abated, however, the legal issues raised by the Iranian assets litigation
are sure to affect both United States and international jurisprudence.
In addition, the history of this litigation and the bankers' own post-
mortems 45 demonstrate the powerful role played by financial institu-
tions in the resolution of international disputes.
appellate briefs, filed in the New York cases, the major banks announced that "other par-
ties" will adequately brief the arguments on the legality of the United States-Iran agree-
ments. However, they also noted: ". . . the [United States] Suggestion of Interest has
forcefully set forth the legal bases which are asserted in support of the actions taken by the
executive branch." Brief for Certain Plaintiff-Appellee Banks at 13, New England
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co., 646 F.2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1981), note 33 supra. In the Supreme Court, the banks gave full public support to the
accord. See text accompanying notes 131-33 supra.
145. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 17, at 63-79 (statements of Richard Puz, Hans H.
Angermueller, John E. Hoffman, Jr., and Alexander M. Vagliano).
